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INTRODUCTION: WHAT WOULD BARNETTE DO?

In the much-revered West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,1 the Supreme Court overturned precedent to hold that public
schools cannot force students to stand and salute the flag.2 Justice Jackson
noted in his majority opinion that the state cannot require “[c]ompulsory
unification of opinion.”3 Dissenters and those with minority opinions and
belonging to minority religions cannot be compelled, under the First

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton Law School. Thanks to the faculty at the University of
Cincinnati Law School for their helpful comments and participation in the faculty exchange during which
a draft of this Essay was presented. I was also greatly enriched by the comments and contributions of the
other participants in this fantastic symposium at Florida International University. Thanks as well to Dallan
Flake and Leah Litman for reading portions of the draft.
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although Barnette is a celebrated opinion among legal scholars, the recent
controversy over professional athletes kneeling for the pledge of allegiance demonstrates that many,
including President Donald Trump, take issue as a policy matter with those who refuse to salute the flag.
See Erica Goldberg, #TakeAKnee, Unity, and Public Versus Private Power, CROWDED THEATER (Sept.
25, 2017), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2017/09/25/takeaknee-unity-and-public-versus-private-power/.
Of course, First Amendment rights often, and by design, protect speech the public disapproves of as a
policy matter.
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”). The Supreme Court overturned Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), an 8-1
decision.
3

Barnette, 319 U.S at 641.
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Amendment, to participate in rituals as a symbolic way of forcing the
population to espouse or project the same views.4
At the 75th anniversary of Barnette, this bedrock principle is being
tested in a very different context. Our current age is one of great fracture, and
some claim that laws enacted to protect the vulnerable may marginalize and
perhaps take away rights from the group that is generally considered the
oppressor.5 Notably, to protect minority groups and those who have
historically been oppressed, the state and federal governments have enacted
legislation or undertaken state action that some claim compels them to
espouse views with which they disagree. Laws designed to protect the
historically marginalized are increasingly being challenged as compelling a
new kind of orthodoxy.6
As examples, Christian bakers are required to create custom-made
wedding cakes for same-sex couples, even if they profess to be opposed to
same-sex marriage,7 and state antidiscrimination laws also require
photographers to photograph same-sex weddings.8 Public employees were
required to contribute funds to unions, even if they are not union members,
despite their political objection to the union’s activities.9 And, in the realm of
free speech culture and perhaps First Amendment doctrine, public university
professors and students at various universities are required to make
statements and otherwise prove their commitment, within and outside of the
classroom, to a particular, somewhat politicized understanding of diversity.10
4 Id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
5 Laws enacted to punish and deter sexual abuse of children come to mind. Recently, the Supreme
Court struck down as a First Amendment violation a North Carolina law prohibiting anyone on the sexual
offender registry from accessing social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter. See Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733–36 (2017).
6 Another way of looking at this dynamic, as described by one scholar, is as a tension between
disfavored minority and elite minority. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment
Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1992 (2016) (describing misunderstandings about “minorityrights enforcement”). Whether a group is in the majority or minority does not materially affect my analysis
here, but “disfavored-minority-elite-minority” is another possible way of understanding the cases I
present. See id.
7 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). The
Court decided Matserpiece Cakeshop on the potentially sui generis ground that the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission showed animus towards religion, leaving for another day the compelled speech question. Id.
at 1732; see also infra Part III.0I am not as convinced as the Supreme Court that statements by the
Commission regarding the historical use of religion to justify bigotry are evidence of religious animus.
8

Ellaine Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).
9

10 See George Leef, Professors Shouldn’t Be Forced to Pledge Allegiance to “Diversity”, FORBES
(May 10, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/05/10/professors-shouldnt-beforced-to-pledge-allegiance-to-diversity/#1b7719cd11cc (discussing how diversity statements are used to
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This new era of compelled speech presents some meaningful differences
with the classic Barnette paradigm. Barnette, written during World War II,
addressed the impropriety of the government’s demanding nationalist
sentiment. The majority based its decision on the constitutional
impermissibility of coercing government-mandated unanimity of values,11
especially in light of the fact that: (1) government coercion to “attain unity”
for any belief causes increases strife among a population, as the stakes for
who gets elected become very high;12 (2) forced loyalty to particular values
leads to deadly consequences, especially under authoritarian regimes;13 and
(3) Barnette does not involve a “collision” of rights—“the sole conflict is
between authority and the rights of the individual.”14
The new “good orthodoxy”15 cases do not involve the government’s
command to show respect for its authority but involve instead states’ attempts
to protect the very marginalized who might be (and indeed have been) targets
of an authoritarian regime. Thus, these modern cases do involve a collision
of rights and present a much lesser threat of the deadly consequences of an
authoritarian regime.
At the same time, these modern cases create potentially new
marginalized groups, and new minority viewpoints, that may deserve
protection from governmental overreach that creates “[c]ompulsory
unification of opinion.”16 The new “good orthodoxy” may implicate the
primary motivator of the Barnette Court: an aversion to mandated uniformity
“weed out” scholars with a classical liberal view of pluralism emphasizing the universality of human
experience over an ideology favoring group-based victimization and entitlements) (citing OR. ASS’N OF
SCHOLARS, THE IMPOSITION OF DIVERSITY STATEMENTS ON FACULTY HIRING AND PROMOTION AT
OREGON
UNIVERSITIES
(2017),
http://www.oregonscholars.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/DiversityStatements_Rev16Mar17.pdf).
11 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (“National unity as an end
which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under
our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.”).
12 Id. at 641 (“As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more
bitter as to whose unity it shall be.”).
13 Id. (“Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”).
14 Id. at 630 (“The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with
rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of
the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin.”). Perhaps this language
was used to ensure that the First Amendment wasn’t marshalled in a way that threatened New Deal
legislation. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 1970–71. Jackson used similar language in a dissent in a later
case when he wrote that, “I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities
begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.” Id. at 1978 (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
15 By placing “good orthodoxy” in quotations, I do not mean to suggest that the goals or even the
policies of those seeking to promote the rights of historically marginalized groups are not good, but to
question whether orthodoxy of views is ever a good thing.
16

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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of opinion, or even simply a show of unanimity of opinion,17 and the political
strife that may ensue.
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette, which seems not to have stood
the test of time, also captures the view of those who wish to compel the new,
good orthodoxy. Justice Frankfurter believed that Justice Jackson’s majority
was overstepping its role and creating exceptions for religious groups who
refuse to salute the flag, even though these religious groups have ample
opportunities to express their views. This powerful dissent would have held
that the state laws requiring the flag salute were “not in fact disguised assaults
upon such dissident views.”18 Many of the objections currently lodged at the
current crop of good orthodoxy cases were lodged against the Barnette
majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter, yet those objections have not altered
the enduring importance of Barnette.19
Unification of opinion around values such as inclusion and tolerance are
surely a better form of orthodoxy than forced patriotism. However, any
attempt to compel allegiance to a particular view has potentially
unconstitutional—and potentially dangerous—consequences. Consider
academia, where not all professors agree with particular approaches to
diversity or inclusion and do not wish to espouse a conception of diversity
based on targeting particular groups for protective, and perhaps remedial,
treatment. Their academic freedom, and their ability to debate important,
open issues involving university priorities and use of the classroom may,
depending on the way the diversity statements are assessed and the pressure
placed on faculty members to echo the university’s views on the topic, be
undermined when universities require them to submit diversity statements in
order to receive promotion and tenure.20
The compelled unanimity of opinion on a range of topics has, according
to some, created ideological hegemony at our institutions of higher learning,
leading to students who are more intolerant to and incapable of engaging with
dissenting views. And yet, the school’s ultimate purpose is noble and
important: tolerance and diversity for both those professors who have

17 See id. at 633 (“It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires
affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates that
pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed
ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture
barren of meaning.”).
18

Id. at 653.

After Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation changed the political balance on the Supreme Court,
the sentiments of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent, arguing for more judicial restraint, have experienced a bit
of a resurgence, although not in the context of questioning the wisdom of Barnette itself. See Samuel
Moyn, Resisting the Juristocracy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/samuelmoyn-resisting-juristocracy.
19

20

See infra Part II.0
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traditionally not been included in academia’s ranks and those students who
felt they could not participate freely in class.
Consider also National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v.
Becerra, a compelled speech case from October Term 2017.21 Becerra held,
among other things, that requiring anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers to
alert patrons to the fact that the state can provide low cost abortions violated
the centers’ First Amendment rights against compelled speech. Becerra does
not fit as neatly into the “good orthodoxy” paradigm because the medical
services aspects of the case complicate any pure issues involving civil rights
versus civil liberties. That said, as Justice Kennedy notes in his concurrence,
California’s belief that its forced disclosure requirements are “forward
thinking” demonstrates the problems with states believing that imposing
hegemony of thought can ever truly be progressive.22
This Essay addresses whether the courts should analyze compelled
speech cases differently where states have enacted laws to promote equality
values instead of the compelled nationalism in Barnette. The paper uses
compelled speech by commercial actors, dues collected from government
employees, and academia to illustrate the new ways states may unfairly
penalize viewpoints while serving historically marginalized populations,
who also need solicitude. I contrast the situation in Barnette to the current
good orthodoxy context, where new groups of dissenters, holding minority
opinions, are being created by laws designed to protect historically oppressed
minority groups. Ultimately, I conclude that there is no such thing as good
orthodoxy. Laws truly compelling speech in order to protect members of
minority groups should be considered as constitutionally suspect as laws
compelling speech to bolster majority opinion.
However, the difference between Barnette and a case like Masterpiece
Cakeshop cannot be ignored. Barnette leaves open whether its opinion should
be read narrowly or broadly, and one way to honor Barnette is to carefully
define what counts as protected speech. Some of the good orthodoxy cases
do not involve pure speech and should not be analyzed as analogous to
Barnette’s objection to forcing citizens “publicly to profess any statement or
belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one.”23 Some of the new
compelled speech cases merit strict scrutiny, and some do not. This Essay
will detail how to distinguish the two types of cases.
In those cases of “pure, protected speech”24 that do deserve strict
scrutiny, I argue that the dignitary interests of minority groups protected by
21

See 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

22

Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

23

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.

In First Amendment analysis, a continuum describes the spectrum from pure, protected speech
to unprotected conduct. Verbal expressions in traditional media, such as art or political philosophy, are
24
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state laws should not be considered as part of the strict scrutiny analysis. The
very dignitary interests states are serving are the desire for individuals to
proclaim that members of vulnerable minority groups deserve equal
treatment. These dignitary interests are important and go beyond mere
offense to a sense of equal status in the eyes of members of the community.
However, the compelling interest the state asserts, when it uses the term
dignitary interest, is the desire to compel uniformity of opinion or at least
compel the appearance of uniformity of opinion. However, for cases that do
not involve pure speech—such as expressive conduct cases—if states have
other, conduct-related reasons for enacting their nondiscrimination and
public accommodations laws, those interests will likely be able to overcome
the intermediate scrutiny applicable to expressive conduct.
Part II of this Essay catalogues modern examples of potential
applications of West Virginia v. Barnette—public accommodations laws
affecting expression, compelled union dues, and forced diversity statements
in academia. That Part further discusses reasons that cases involving a state
law’s protection of the historically underserved should be treated the same
as, and reasons these scenarios should be treated differently from, Barnette.
Part III articulates my own proposal: that courts treat “good orthodoxy” cases
involving protection of the vulnerable the same as traditional compelled
speech cases, but only when the targeted expression is pure speech, which
will be the case less often in these modern cases.
II. WHY THE “GOOD ORTHODOXY” MIGHT BE BAD
After confronting a history rife with racism, forced internment, and both
governmental and private discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities,
women, and the LGBT community, states and the federal governments have
the classic examples of pure speech. Symbolic communication made through conduct—like burning a
draft card or having a parade—is expressive conduct, which receives intermediate scrutiny. See infra Part
III.A. Conduct is fully regulable behavior, even if it communicates something. Murder is unprotected,
entirely regulable conduct, even if the murderer is also expressing hatred for the victim. The main, and
most appreciated, goal of the conduct of murder to end the person’s life, not to communicate a message
or change the way the victim thinks or feels. However, even if a murder designed to terrorize a population
were considered expressive conduct, not unprotected conduct, the government can easily survive
intermediate scrutiny in its prohibition of murder. Id. Further, even some types of verbal expression
become unprotected when they veer into the realm of conduct, such as threats that leave listeners in fear
of physical harm or harassment that deprives a listener of her ability to maintain her job or receive her
education. Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 721–22 (2016)
(discussing how certain categories of speech are unprotected because the harms they impose closely
resemble conduct harms); see also id. at 742 (discussing courts’ treatment of harassment). There are other
exceptions to First Amendment protection for pure speech, or other types of speech that receive reduced
First Amendment protection, but these categories are either considered historically unprotected by the
courts or created for reasons other than their content or message. See id. at 693, 713, 717 (discussing ways
in which unprotected categories of speech are created).
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begun to pay more attention to the needs of minority groups. Governments
trying to remedy the effects of systemic bigotry, which contributes to
accumulated disadvantages and socio-cultural biases,25 do so both by
changing their own treatment of these groups and by prohibiting private
individuals from engaging in certain types of discrimination. These measures
are then applied in ways that some now argue stifle their rights and interfere
with the important right to express dissenting and counter-cultural opinions.
In this Part, I catalog some of the laws or government policies that compel
adherence to the currently accepted ideology in potentially unconstitutional
ways.
A.

Cake Baking, Photograph Making, and Union Dues Taking

In the commercial sector, business owners and employees have begun
advancing compelled speech arguments against the application of laws
designed to protect historically underprivileged groups.
Non-discrimination and public accommodations laws, originally
enacted during the civil rights era, prevent discrimination on the basis of
membership in particular groups, including on the basis of sexual
orientation.26 These laws have been critical in allowing people to move freely
throughout the country and participate productively in the marketplace
without worrying that they will not be able to find places of lodging,
restaurants, and other necessary goods and services due to their membership
in particular disfavored minority groups.27
Some religious people have claimed these laws compel their acceptance
and participation in certain practices to which they have a moral objection.
As examples, the Supreme Court recently decided Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case involving whether a self-styled
“cake artist” may refuse to create a custom-designed cake for a same-sex
wedding.28 The Supreme Court did not address the compelled speech issue,
leaving it open for future cases.29 In what would likely have been a better
25 See Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
313, 330 (2002).
26 See generally Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (2016) (offering an account of the purpose and variety of states’ public accommodations
laws and their interaction with religion).
27 Id. at 662–65 (describing the individual, collective, and democratic purposes served by
antidiscrimination laws). Antidiscrimination laws also serve to communicate messages of equal dignity
and to prevent people from experiencing humiliation, id. at 664, although those purposes are more
constitutionally suspect when they infringe upon an individual’s expressive rights. See infra Part III.B.
28

138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).

Justices Thomas and Gorsuch are the only Justices who provided thoughts on the free speech
issue. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29
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vehicle to decide the free speech issue, the Supreme Court previously denied
certiorari in Ellaine Photography v. Willock, about whether a professional
photographer has a First Amendment right to refuse to take photographs at
same-sex weddings.30 A new iteration of Masterpiece Cakeshop, which
involves a request to bake a pink and blue birthday cake that also celebrates
a woman’s coming out as transgender, is also percolating through the
litigation process.31
In another context, states have authorized unions to require “fair share
fees,” so that unions can perform their task of negotiating on behalf of
employees.32 The history of unions is one of giving historically marginalized
workers better protections and conditions against powerful employers.33
Now, some claim that these union dues compel employees to support political
causes with which they disagree.34 Even non-union members must pay dues
that fund a union’s working against efficiency measures such as merit-based
pay, for example. Employees may disagree with this stance, which they
describe as political, especially for public sector unions, where each
negotiation affects public policy and the public fisc.35 Here, the proffered
compelled speech exists in the form of compelled union dues used to support
union activity. Even a non-union employee in states requiring fair share fees
must contribute “money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves.”36
Many believe these types of good orthodoxy cases do not implicate the
First Amendment right against compelled speech. To these scholars, the
expansive use of the First Amendment in the commercial and employment
30 See Brief for American Unity Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4,
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf
(arguing that although cakes are not speech, application of public accommodations laws to traditional
media like photography would violate the First Amendment).
31 See Erica Goldberg, The Resurrection of Masterpiece Cakeshop – A Different Free Speech Issue
and
a
Different
Legal
Landscape,
CROWDED
THEATER
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/09/17/the-resurrection-of-masterpiece-cakeshop-a-different-freespeech-issue-and-a-different-legal-landscape/.
32 Aaron Tang, Public Sector Unions, The First Amendment, and the Costs of Collective
Bargaining, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 146–47 (2016) (explaining that the purpose of these fees is “to ensure
sufficient financial support for unions in pursuit of the collective benefits that effective workplace
representation can produce, both for public sector workers and the quality and efficiency of public services
writ large.”).
33 See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016) (describing unions as a “core
equalizing institution in politics and the economy.”).
34

See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2461 (2018).

35

This was the basis for the First Amendment challenge. Id.

Tang, supra note 32, at 146 (quoting Thomas Jefferson’s idea that “to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical,”
Irving Brant, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787 354 (1948)).
36
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sectors represents a so-called “new Lochner,” where business interests or
political groups are using the First Amendment as a sword to advance their
policy goals, instead of as a shield to simply protect their First Amendment
rights against unconstitutional policy.37 Power, not reason, is the Court’s
currency on these issues, some argue,38 and these First Amendment claims
are a pretext for partisan advocacy for policy goals. Business organizations
and think tanks bringing these First Amendment claims are advancing
radically new First Amendment positions because of their business interests,
they claim. Religious objections to neutrally applicable laws on the claim that
the religious objector does not want to take part in a sexually immoral activity
are not truly religious, but political, some argue.39 Indeed, “complicity-based
conscience claims are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups
and individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious
denominational lines and in coordination with a political party.”40
Further, in the clash of rights between religious objectors and members
of historically persecuted communities, some argue to “beware of the false
equivalence.”41 Tolerance for religion does not have to mean allowing
religious people to discriminate against others.42 There is a compelling
argument that the right not to be discriminated against—claimed by the samesex spouses in Masterpiece Cakeshop—is more legitimate than the right to
discriminate claimed by the baker, even given evidence that one’s right to
discriminate is being taken away due to religious animus.43
37 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 136 (2016) (arguing that using
the First Amendment to achieve deregulatory goals in the style of Lochner “benefits from a crossideological coalition formed around earlier uses of the First Amendment while allowing Lochner itself to
remain in the anticanon.”).
38 See Garrett Epps, The Bogus ‘Free Speech’ Claim Against Unions, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-bogus-free-speech-argument-againstunions/553205/. Epps believes that Janus is a way for the Supreme Court to dismantle the political power
of unions, separate from any legitimate First Amendment claims. Id.
39 Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015) (“[C]omplicity-based conscience claims have
become a locus of mobilized political action seeking law reform designed to preserve traditional sexual
morality.”).
40

Id. at 2542–43.

See, e.g., Carolina Mala Corbin, Masterpiece Cakeshop: Beware the False Equivalence, TAKE
CARE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-beware-the-falseequivalence.
41

42 Id. (“Tolerating discrimination and tolerating the desire not to be discriminated against are
simply not the same.”).
43 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority opinion partially based its holding in favor of the baker
on evidence that the Civil Rights Commission made some inflammatory and potentially animus-based
comments about religion when deciding whether Colorado’s public accommodations law applied to Jack
Phillips. Diann Rice, one of the Commissioners, commented that:

Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout
history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the Holocaust . . . I mean, we can list hundreds of
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However, religious adherents may have mobilized as a political group
because their First Amendment rights are being marginalized by the new,
good orthodoxy. Further, the Court’s dismantling economic regulation that
affects speech has long been well intertwined with upholding First
Amendment liberties, and, indeed, cannot be easily reduced to partisan
lines.44
Importantly, the motivation for filing a lawsuit may not be dispositive
in determining the interpretation of the constitutional provision at stake. Even
if political, not legal, incentives motivate litigants, the Court retains its duty
to resolve the legal merits of the dispute using legal frameworks. Of course,
if an actor’s motive means his conduct is not truly expressive, this may affect
the resolution of the First Amendment claim. If a Christian baker does not
generally consider his cakes to be expressive vehicles, but simply does not
want to serve members of the LBGT community, this should factor into the
First Amendment analysis. However, determining a litigant’s true motivation
is difficult, and, if conduct expresses a generally appreciable message,
casting aspersions on a litigant’s motive should not defeat a free speech
claim.
False equivalence arguments, between the right to discriminate and the
right to be free from discrimination, are also unavailing because the true clash
of rights in a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop is between the civil right to
have the state prevent private parties from discriminating against you
(represented by the public accommodations laws) and the liberty of avoiding
the state’s coercing you to perform labor that you wish to avoid, which may
amount to compelled speech (represented by the First Amendment). The
Christian baker does not want “tolerance” for his ability to discriminate; he
is instead asserting his civil liberty against state coercion in the form of
compelled speech.45
Further, as Professor Richard Epstein argues, the state’s requiring
someone to choose between his livelihood and his religion is actual coercion,
whereas there is no legal coercion when a buyer can access goods elsewhere,

situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use . . . their religion to hurt others.
Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
583, 585 (2016) (citing Alliance Defending Freedom, Revealed: Colo. Commissioner Compared Cake
Artist to Nazi (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/9479).
44

See Kessler, supra note 6, at 1918, 1924–25, 1989.

Although some have argued that this is a case about religion, and the Supreme Court ultimately
decided this specific case on those grounds, Masterpiece Cakeshop is truly a speech case, precisely
because of the interaction between Barnette and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79
(1990), which held that neutral, generally applicable laws that burden speech do not violate the free
exercise clause. See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory
of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 313–16 (2000); see also infra Part III.A.
45
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just not at her preferred seller.46 There is no rights-based harm, according to
Epstein, from refusing to serve someone in a competitive marketplace
because we do not have the right to someone else’s labor. That person can go
elsewhere for a cake, unlike the seller, who must choose between his religion
and his livelihood.47
If the clash of rights is framed this way, a case like Masterpiece
Cakeshop looks a lot more like Barnette. If LGBT individuals can simply get
cakes elsewhere, then what Colorado’s public accommodations law is doing
is forcing a Christian baker to acknowledge the “dignity” of the LGBT
community, which looks like more of a forced ceremony of tolerance and
respect in the same way saluting the flag is a show of national unity and pride.
However, if instead, public accommodations laws serve necessary economic
functions, where “some citizens are singled out to bear significant costs of
another’s religious exercise”48 or exercise of First Amendment rights, these
“good orthodoxy” cases look very different than Barnette.
Ultimately, the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop based its opinion on the
case-specific religious animus demonstrated by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. Concurrences by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch articulated
different views as to how a civil rights commission must treat blank cakes, if
the commission allows other bakers to refuse to create anti-gay cakes.49 The
compelled speech elements were not resolved in the majority opinion, and
this Essay will later address how future Courts should handle these issues.50
B.

Public Universities and Diversity Statements

Both the constitutionally-afforded rights and constitutionally-permitted
powers of the university, and the context in which university decisionmaking takes place, illuminate why requiring professors to write diversity
statements may implicate some of the concerns articulated in Barnette.
Public universities enjoy academic freedom, but the state institutions
must also respect the academic freedom rights of their professors, derived

46 Epstein, supra note 43, at 585–86 (“The ability to attribute coercive behavior to the victims of
coercion is one dire consequence of this massive breakdown in the English language.”).
47 Id. at 586 (“Note the relative sacrifices. In a competitive market, dozens of other cake shops
can, and will, serve this couple. But the proprietor who is forced to either go out of business or suffer
reeducation has no such luxury in responding to government commands.”).
48

Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 39, at 2521.

See Erica Goldberg, SCOTUS Term: The Scope of Masterpiece Cakeshop Will Be Determined
by
the
Concurrences,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(June
4,
2018),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/06/scotus-term-the-scope-of-the-masterpiececakeshop-decision-will-be-determined-by-the-concurrences.html.
49

50

See infra Part III.A.
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from both the First Amendment and professional norms.51 This tension
becomes apparent in the context of issues surrounding diversity measures to
include members of historically underrepresented groups. The Supreme
Court has held that public universities’ academic freedom rights allow them
to implement affirmative action plans that involve some racial discrimination
against majority applicants in order to create diversity that enhances
classroom discussion and the classroom experience.52 Thus, despite the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, affirmative action may
properly be employed to further the legitimate pedagogical goals of an
institution.53 As an extension of this, and to serve important pedagogical
values, public universities often ask professors to demonstrate that they are
fostering an environment that allows underrepresented minorities to feel
welcome and included.
Many public universities require diversity statements as part of the
faculty hiring or promotion process. As examples, the University of
California San Diego asks that professors provide a statement to “describe
your past efforts, as well as future plans to advance diversity, equity and
inclusion. It should demonstrate an understanding of the barriers facing
women and underrepresented minorities and of UC San Diego’s mission to
meet the educational needs of our diverse student population..”54 At Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, “candidates should include a list
of activities that promote or contribute to inclusive teaching, research,
outreach, and service.”55 The University of Cincinnati has announced that
“[f]aculty and administrative/professional applicants will be asked to submit
a personal statement summarizing his or her contributions (or potential

51 Professional and constitutional academic freedom rights are not entirely coextensive. Private
universities and public universities generally respect ethical academic freedom rights, whereas public
universities must respect academic freedom to the extent it is enshrined in the First Amendment. Grutter
tells us that institutions have their own academic freedom rights which may conflict with individual
professor’s and student’s academic freedom rights. See Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring “A
Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 217, 221–23 (2011) (offering some solutions to “the conflict between the institutional academic
freedom rights of the university and the individual academic freedom rights of its faculty” that analyze
whether a decision is truly academic and which party possesses the academic expertise to resolve the
decision).
52

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003).

Id. at 325 (“Rather, ‘[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.’” (quoting Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978))).
53

54 Center for Diversity & Inclusion, Contributions to Diversity Statements, UNIV. OF CAL. SAN
DIEGO, http://facultydiversity.ucsd.edu/recruitment/contributions-to-diversity.html.
55 OFFICE OF THE EXEC. VICE PRESIDENT AND PROVOST, VIRGINIA TECH GUIDELINES FOR
PROMOTION
AND
TENURE
DOSSIERS
FOR
2015-2016
(2015),
https://www.provost.vt.edu/content/dam/provost_vt_edu/promotion_tenure/promotion_and_tenure_guid
elines_2015-16.pdf
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contributions) to diversity, inclusion and leadership.”56 Some universities
allow professors to fulfill the diversity statement’s goals by belonging to a
historically underrepresented group.57
Although Grutter held that serving and maintaining a diverse population
is a legitimate pedagogical goal of an academic institution, many have argued
that mandated diversity statements force professors to swear loyalty to a
particular view of diversity that maps onto political ideology in a way that
resembles the unconstitutional loyalty oaths that professors had to sign in the
1940s and 1950s.58 Universities, they argue, should not (and perhaps cannot
if they are public universities) mandate that every professor share the same
views of the importance of specific types of diversity that track membership
in underrepresented groups, as opposed to emphasizing or prioritizing
diversity of ideas or experiences, or even other legitimate, critical academic
values that may exist in tension with the stated goal of diversity.59 Even more
so, universities should not force professors to proclaim allegiance to a
particular ideological, and perhaps partisan, view of how to foster diversity
and inclusion, one that favors focusing on group membership, group benefits
and penalties, and generalizations about how membership in particular
groups affects our status, interactions, and opportunities.60 Requiring
professors to demonstrate adherence to a particular view of diversity in their
scholarship is even more troubling, from an academic freedom perspective.
There are ways to require these sorts of statements that may not be
constitutionally problematic. Some implementations of this goal, however,
may cross a constitutional line into mandating hegemony of viewpoint on
how to resolve racial inequalities.61 At some point, the measures designed to
56 See Brittany Harris, A Point of View: Hiring for Inclusion, INCLUSION SOLUTION (June 23,
1016), http://www.theinclusionsolution.me/a-point-of-view-hiring-for-inclusion/; Jon Miltimore,
‘Diversity and Inclusion’ Statements Required on Campus, INTELL. TAKEOUT (July 12, 2016),
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/blog/diversity-and-inclusion-statements-required-campus.
57 See OREGON ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, supra note 10 (“At Carnegie Mellon University . . .
candidates can also pass the litmus test if they ‘represent a historically underrepresented group in [their]
field based on [their] race, ethnicity, or gender.”).
58 See Walter E. Williams, College Diversity Statements the New Loyalty Oath, REFLECTOR.COM
(Apr.
10,
2017),
http://www.reflector.com/Op-Ed/2017/04/10/Metastasizing-AcademicCancer.html?fullsize=1&item=. According to Williams, “[c]ollege diversity agendas are little more than
a call for ideological conformity. Diversity only means racial, sex and sexual orientation quotas. . . . The
last thing that diversity hustlers want is diversity in ideas.” Id.
59 See Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on Diversity Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov.
12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweet-againstrequired-faculty-diversity-statements-sets-debate.
60 See Leef, supra note 10 (“[I]nstead of having to pledge support for America in its battle against
communism, the new pledge is support to the ‘diversity’ agenda in its battle against a color-blind nation
where people are evaluated on their own merits rather than group membership.”).
61 Professors Robert Post and Erwin Chemerinsky have debated in popular media the extent to
which the First Amendment is relevant at public universities. See Robert C. Post, There Is No First
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foster the legitimate pedagogical goal of diversity evolve into advancing a
partisan view of how to achieve particular social justice aims, not how to
educate. The context in which diversity statements are required heightens the
ways in which these mandated statements may be compelled speech.
Universities are already criticized, often by their own leaders, for
imposing ideological hegemony and creating students who are intolerant of
opposing views.62 Forced attendance at certain events where students must
accept and participate in political or ideological accounts of the world have
been criticized by civil libertarians and by students.63 Some professional
schools have been denounced as indoctrinating students within a particular
ideology, and politicians capitalize on these concerns to remove funding from
state universities, further threatening academic freedom.64
To be sure, the punishing of professors and students for views the
administration finds objectionable spans the political spectrum.65 However,
academia in general is much more liberal than the general population. Law
school professors are even more liberal than the population of lawyers, which
is already more liberal than the average American.66 Some studies indicate

Amendment Right to Speak on a College Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017, 11:33 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milospencer-protests; Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech Is Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses,
VOX (Dec. 26 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-freespeech-first-amendment-protest. Although there are some open questions at the margins, the Supreme
Court, at least, has described some aspects of university life as involving a limited public forum, and some
as involving a traditional public forum. In either of these types of forum, a state university cannot
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (barring
viewpoint discrimination in the application of a student activities fee that funds publications).
62 See, e.g., John Etchemendy, Speech before the Stanford Board of Trustees: ‘The Threat From
Within’, (Transcript of excerpt available at https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/21/the-threat-fromwithin/). In a speech the former provost of Stanford University noted that, “Over the years, I have watched
a growing intolerance at universities in this country – not intolerance along racial or gender lines – there,
we have made laudable progress. Rather, a kind of intellectual intolerance, a political one-sidedness, that
is the antithesis of what universities should stand for.” Id.
63 See Carrie Pritt, Diversity for the Sake of Democracy, QUILETTE (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://quillette.com/2017/01/24/diversity-for-the-sake-of-democracy/.
64 See Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Elitists, Crybabys, and Junky Degrees, WASH. POST (Nov.
25,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2017/11/25/elitists-crybabies-and-junkydegrees/?utm_term=.df497fd4e233.
65 See, e.g., Adam Steinbaugh, Professor Fired For Defending Black Lives Matter on Fox News
Files Lawsuit, FIRE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/professor-fired-for-defending-black-livesmatter-on-fox-news-files-lawsuit/; The Editorial Board, A Jesuit School Gets Dogmatic: Is Marquette’s
Promise of Academic Freedom Worth Anything?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:56 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-jesuit-school-gets-dogmatic-1515362173?mod=rss_opinion_main.
66 Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Kyle Rozema, & Maya Sen, The Legal Academy’s Ideological
Conformity,
J.
LEGAL
STUD.
(forthcoming
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953087. The study’s authors argue that although
the legal academy is more liberal than the population of lawyers, even after controlling for relevant identity
characteristics, any solution to this problem may compromise other values. Id. (discussing “some
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that this is due to viewpoint discrimination in hiring, demonstrated by the fact
that conservative academics outperform the median academic.67 It is only
human to judge as more academically rigorous or useful the ideas with which
one agrees,68 but academics must either fight against this urge or lose their
claim to academic credibility. Further, at public universities, viewpoint
discrimination in hiring violates the First Amendment.69
Academic institutions, in other contexts, are increasingly perceived to
have failed to impart broad-mindedness and intellectual openness on their
students, perhaps due to social justice aims these institutions believe are more
important. In our current polarized political climate, students routinely call
for speakers, especially those with more conservative views, to be disinvited
from speaking on campus, even when invited by student groups at public
universities with their own First Amendment rights.70 Many of these calls
conflate people with ideas that are more conservative, or less obviously
progressive, even on economic issues, with people who are overtly racist or
white supremacists.71

suggestive evidence that a tradeoff between ideological balance and diversity-oriented hiring prerogatives
likely exist”).
67 James C. Phillips, Why Are There So Few Conservatives and Libertarians in Legal Academia?
An Empirical Exploration of Three Hypothesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 196–97 (2016). For an
alternative take, see Michael Vitello, Liberal Bias in the Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS.
L.J. 507, 510 (2007) (acknowledging “that law faculties may be further left than the legal profession as a
whole, but the data do not support the conclusion that law faculties tilt far to the left.”).
68 Indeed, an empirical study of political contributions concludes that legal scholarship displays a
political bias, thus undermining the “objectivity” of legal scholarship and the academic endeavor. See
Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277 (2015). Of course, those who donate to political campaigns may be more likely to display
political bias in their legal scholarship than those wishing to avoid partisan affiliations. See id. at 291–92
(noting the likelihood “that most nondonors have political commitments, and as a result we decided to
take an alternative approach to identifying the ideology of the law professors in our sample. The approach
we elected to use was to code their ideology using information available on their curriculum vitae
(CVs).”).
69 At least some aspects of a public university have been considered by the Supreme Court to be
a public forum, and viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even in a limited public forum. See Epstein,
supra note 43.
70 The calls to disinvite Christina Hoff Sommers when invited by the Lewis and Clark Law School
Federalist Society are illustrative. Lewis and Clark is a private university and is not constitutionally
required to respect students’ free speech rights, but the example shows an increasing intolerance to any
views deemed to oppose the interests of women or historically oppressed minority groups. Christina Hoff
Summers, due to her views about how to tackle the wage gap or handle campus sexual assault cases, was
labeled a “fascist” by several affinity student groups. See Christina Sommers (@CHSommers), TWITTER
(Mar. 5, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://twitter.com/CHSommers/status/970704358001094656.
71 These calls likely do not represent the majority of students, but chanting “liberalism is white
supremacy” as a way of shouting down a speaker from the American Civil Liberties Union at a planned
event reflects an atrophying free speech culture on campus. See The Intolerant Fifth: Free Speech at
American Universities Is Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2017/10/12/free-speech-at-american-universities-is-under-threat.

654

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:639

Articulating any sort of causal claim about the increasing intolerance of
students and the lack of intellectual diversity on university campuses is
difficult and beyond the scope of this paper. This context is important,
however, for understanding the First Amendment concerns associated with
requiring prospective or current faculty to articulate their views about
diversity in order to be hired or retain their positions.
Without detracting from any legitimate academic mission of the
university, some professors may believe in a more classical liberal
understanding of racial justice and nondiscrimination, in which members of
all groups have shared, universal rights, and where too much of an emphasis
on achieving group-based diversity, making group-based generalizations, or
targeting group-based remediation is both divisive and unfair. The Oregon
Association of Scholars argues that the “threat to academic freedom and
research excellence is acute,” when diversity statements are imposed upon
university faculty, because these statements function as an “ideological
litmus test.”72 Indeed, university professors advising on how to craft a
diversity statement have told prospective applicants that they need not apply
if they do not share the university’s particular definition of and approach to
diversity.73 According to the White Paper of the Oregon Association of
Scholars:
While in theory, the concepts of diversity, equity, and
inclusion could be interpreted in ways consistent with
different political viewpoints, in practice they have been
consistently and exclusively defined by university officials
to emphasize the values and assumptions of left-wing
viewpoints in society. These can be summarized as an
emphasis on group identity; an assumption of group
victimization; and a claim for group-based entitlements.
Classical liberal approaches, that emphasize the pluralism of
a free society, the universalism of human experiences, and
the importance of equality before the law, have been
regarded as invalid. So too have conservative approaches
that focus on shared values and the sacredness of the private
realm and individual morality. More broadly, the idea of a
university as a place where leading scholars are protected
from any ideological imposition is also rejected.74
These objections cannot be dismissed on the ground that professional
speech can be more heavily regulated than other speech, or that faculty
72

OREGON ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, supra note 10, at 5.

73

Id. at 4–5.

74

Id. at 4.
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members are frequently asked to express views, through voting or otherwise,
that are ultimately not accepted by an institution. First, academic freedom
principles dictate that the lower constitutional scrutiny afforded the speech
of government employees is likely inapplicable to university professors.75
The teaching and scholarship of professors are more tightly connected to
critical First Amendment ideals than the speech of, for example, a doctor,
which is bound up in the conduct of performing a medical examination.76
Second, diversity statements are different than the expression of a
faculty member’s opinion that the administration ultimately rejects, such as
a vote on hiring or a curricular issue or a controversial statement at a faculty
meeting. The faculty member must complete the diversity statement, whereas
she can always abstain from voting or refrain from speaking—and there is
great pressure to echo the views of the administration, in part because of the
mandatory nature of the statements. A faculty member understands that her
job depends on successful communication on the form, yet she is also being
asked for her opinion on a heavily contested and political issue.
Objections to mandated diversity statements can perhaps be dismissed
as advanced by those seeking to undermine the university’s legitimate
mission of enhancing diversity, sanctioned by Grutter. However, if a public
university’s true goal in requiring these sorts of diversity statements is to
increase minority presence in order to remedy past discrimination, that
political goal is not permitted under Grutter, which explicitly based its
holding on a diversity of viewpoints and experiences rationale as the
compelling interest justifying state discrimination.77 If a university’s true
goal is to serve a variety of students in order to expose students to a diverse
range of ideas, the permissible compelling interest in Grutter that validated
race-based affirmation action despite Equal Protection challenges by those
applicants discriminated against in admissions, most are not doing a

75

According to the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos:

There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.
547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
76 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”).
77 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–24 (2003) (describing the precedents’ rejection of “an
interest in remedying societal discrimination because such measures would risk placing unnecessary
burdens on innocent third parties ‘who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered” (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978))).
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commendable job, given the lack of political, intellectual, and ideological
diversity at most universities.
Universities may be basing their diversity statements on either an
unconstitutional or a pretextual purpose. Or, universities may simply be
ensuring that all students are treated fairly, given data showing race- and
gender-based implicit bias in evaluating individuals. However, forcing
professors to articulate specific views placing a high priority on specific types
of diversity to advance a specific understanding of diversity, using specific,
often remedial measures that target students for disparate treatment does
appear to implicate the concerns articulated in Barnette. Professors should be
empowered to articulate meaningful disagreements on this important topic,
in order to find the right solutions for best educating students and advancing
knowledge, the legitimate pedagogical goals of a university. Even if the
university is permissibly committed to a particular goal, it must leave room
for other professors to disagree—or progress will come to a halt in the service
of good orthodoxy.
In the next section, I explore arguments for and against applying
Barnette to cases like the ones above, where the state’s laws or university
policies are designed to promote the rights of minorities, not the populist
cause of nationalism.
III. APPROACHING MODERN APPLICATIONS OF BARNETTE
Compelled unanimity of opinion is unconstitutional under Barnette. The
government can articulate its own message, and it has greater leeway to
control professional speech that is related to professional conduct and the
provision of professional services,78 and commercial advertising.79 However,
the government generally cannot require private parties to profess views upon
78 The Supreme Court has not provided guidance on the standard with which professional speech
should be judged, and lower courts have split on the issue. See Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional
Help: Advocating for a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2023 (2015) (“Some courts have held that professional advice
does not even qualify as speech under the First Amendment, while others have found that professional
advice receives the heightened First Amendment protection of intermediate scrutiny.”). Claudia Haupt
argues that professional speech is worthy of First Amendment protection, regardless of the profession,
based on “three core elements: (1) a knowledge community’s insights, (2) communicated by a professional
within the professional-client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing professional advice. The first
element concerns the role of knowledge communities.” Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE
L.J. 1238, 1247–48 (2016).
79 Even in the context of commercial advertising, however, some messages the government wishes
the seller to convey may be struck down as unconstitutional. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“We recognize that unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech. But we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”).
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which the state wishes to communicate consensus. The scenarios described
in the previous Part all implicate the imposition of a “good orthodoxy,” to
varying degrees.
However, the “collision of rights” aspect of the good orthodoxy cases
described above distinguishes them from Barnette. One way to acknowledge
this distinction is to conclude, consistent with First Amendment protections,
that the expression of pure, protected speech,80 which merits strict scrutiny,
does not violate anyone’s rights, thus avoiding a collision, even if the speech
is offensive and corrosive to historically marginalized groups.81 But laws
affecting expressive conduct (not pure speech) that undermine the civil rights
of others may survive constitutional scrutiny, as long as speech and
expression are not greatly curtailed, and as long as the legislation is not
designed to achieve a good orthodoxy. This paradigm requires courts to (1)
recognize when speech is pure speech versus expressive conduct, (2)
determine whether laws affecting expressive conduct are too restrictive, and
(3) consider whether the motive of the legislature has aspects that are
intended to compel unanimity of opinion.
A.

Defining Speech

Although some frame the issues presented in Masterpiece Cakeshop as
primarily implicating religious liberty,82 at heart, similar cases should be
considered compelled speech cases. Masterpiece Cakeshop involved what
the Supreme Court deemed explicit religious animus and disparate treatment
on the basis of religion, but similar cases involving expressive rights and
public accommodations laws need not necessarily implicate religious
animus. Those cases should be considered, at heart, about free speech rights.
Barnette itself established a framework where protections against compelled
speech and unanimity of opinion apply equally to religious claimants and
those espousing any other ideology.83 Justice Jackson’s majority opinion
80 As noted earlier, I mean to distinguish this type of speech from expressive conduct or speech
that falls within an unprotected or less protected category. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates
v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81 This accords with First Amendment jurisprudence, where even speech that is degrading to
particular identity groups is protected. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (finding
unconstitutional as a First Amendment violation the Lanham Act’s “disparagement clause,” which denies
trademarks to marks that demean particular groups).
82 Indeed, the very narrow opinion ruled on religious liberty grounds, see supra Part II.A., but the
difficult questions about the interaction between public accommodations laws and the First Amendment
remain open.
83 Bybee, supra note 45, at 328–29 (arguing that, because of the jurisprudence of Justices Jackson
and Scalia, “the First Amendment protects religious exercise from regulation as a religious exercise,
speech from regulation as speech, and press from regulation as press, but that the First Amendment does
not grant special privileges to persons exercising such freedoms.”).
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opted not to hold that religious adherents receive an exemption from
generally applicable laws; instead, the opinion held that the state does not
have the power to compel certain forms of expression, regardless of the
identity of the speaker.84 If the state cannot require the Jehovah’s Witnesses
to salute the flag, it cannot require anyone to salute the flag.85
Thus, the religious aspects of Barnette are immaterial to the majority’s
reasoning, and Barnette is explicitly about state power to regulate speech for
all. Given that the essence of issues presented in cases like Masterpiece
Cakeshop, and in a case like Janus, involve free speech rights, not religious
liberty, a court confronting a similar case must first decide whether the
legislation at issue affects pure speech or expressive conduct (or, simply
conduct, in which case there is no First Amendment protection at all).
Content-based restrictions on pure speech must survive strict scrutiny,86 a
highly protective standard that should not be lightly diluted even in the
service of important civil rights goals.87 Restrictions on expressive conduct
receive intermediate scrutiny, rendering laws valid so long as they are
appropriately tailored to an important government interest and do not overly
burden expression.88
Distinguishing pure speech from expressive conduct, at the margins, is
not an easy task.89 Articulating a pithy formula for distinguishing pure speech
84

Id. at 329–30. According to the Court in Barnette:

Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession of particular religious views or the sincerity
with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees’ motive for enduring the discomforts of
making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a
compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to inquire
whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to
make the salute a legal duty.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1943).
85

Bybee, supra note 45, at 328–30.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (“Because the Town’s Sign Code
imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if they
survive strict scrutiny, ‘which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”) (internal quotations omitted).
86

87 The balancing framework’s subjectivity can erode free speech rights, making it all the more
important that strict scrutiny remain strict. See Goldberg, supra note 24, at 688 & n.2 (arguing that the
indeterminacy of harms balancing in First Amendment law “has the potential to undermine strong free
speech protections and our faith in neutral principles underlying the First Amendment.”).
88 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”). Expressive conduct occurs when “‘speech’ and ‘non-speech’
elements” combine in a single act. Id. at 376.
89 Something like writing a poem is obviously pure speech, and something like burning a draft
card or nude dancing clearly involves expressive conduct, but activities like cake making and photograph
taking for commercial purposes fall somewhere in between these delineated extremes.
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from expressive conduct may prove impossible, but factors the courts could
consider include the extent to which the expression is part of other heavily
regulated conduct; the extent to which the medium is generally used to
communicate a range of ideas, facts, and opinions; the intent of the speaker;
and the extent to which reasonable people perceive the conduct as expressive.
Courts examining behavior that may be expressive conduct analyze whether
the government is regulating the conduct in order to control the content90 and
whether a reasonable observer would attribute a specific message to the
speaker.91
The Masterpiece Cakeshop majority opinion did not address whether a
blank cake is pure speech or expressive conduct. Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, would have held that a blank cake is
expressive conduct; he would have applied strict scrutiny to the
Commission’s decision regardless because, according to this concurrence,
“Colorado would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to create any custom
wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom
wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex marriage.”92
Instead, I believe the O’Brien test applied to expressive conduct is the
appropriate test for the cake at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Colorado’s
public accommodations law does not target viewpoint but ensures equal
access of goods and services in the marketplace regardless of sexual
orientation.93 A blank wedding cake does contain expressive elements, and

90 In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court assumed flag burning was expressive conduct and held
that the government may not regulate this activity for the purpose of controlling the message. 491 U.S.
397, 407 (1989). “It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the
governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.”
Id. at 406–07.
91 Id. at 404 (“In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1746 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
93 Justice Thomas believes that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the state’s compulsion was related to
the suppression of expression, because the Commission “would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to
create any custom wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom wedding cakes
that express approval of same-sex marriage.” Id. I do not believe this is the correct locus for analysis. The
law at issue’s purpose, including as applied to this case, is to secure goods for same-sex couples as easily
as opposite-sex couples, and this purpose is unrelated to the suppression of expression. However, I agree
with Justice Thomas that purposes of preventing cake sellers from “denigrating the dignity of same-sex
couples, asserting their inferiority and subjecting them to humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment,”
id., is related to the communicative element of the expressive conduct and may not be considered in the
O’Brien analysis. For further discussion on this point, see infra Part III.B.
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the history and use of the wedding cake connect it to a rich and symbolic
expressive tradition.94
However, this type of expressive conduct may withstand O’Brien
scrutiny—especially if a civil rights commission’s goal is not to compel a
particular message but to ensure equal access to the marketplace. In future
cases involving different levels of expression of the cake, the O’Brien test
should yield different results depending on how much speech is being
suppressed. This would represent a reading of O’Brien where, the greater the
intrusion on expression, the larger the interest the government would need to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, as opposed to the reading that appears on
the face of the test—which is that if there is any intrusion on speech, the
government must simply tailor that intrusion narrowly to serve its significant
interest without unduly intruding upon expression.95
Cakes as art span an expressive continuum. The writing on a cake, if
conveying a unique message,96 likely should be considered pure speech, as
should expressive media like photographs and paintings that do not involve
heavily regulated conduct elements involving the preparation and cooking of
food. On the other end of the spectrum, the pre-fabricated cakes produced
without a customer in mind should be considered pure conduct. A blank cake,
produced in a custom-made, artistic way, likely contains enough expressive
elements to be expressive conduct, not pure conduct.
Although a blank, custom-made wedding cake is expressive conduct,
important legislative goals unrelated to the suppression of expression will
withstand O’Brien scrutiny. A blank custom-made cake contains so many
conduct-like elements, is produced by a heavily regulated industry, and is
usually produced for consumption, not artistic communication. Plus, the
application of the expressive conduct test demonstrates that very little speech
appreciable by a reasonable observer would be compelled by requiring bakers
to offer cakes on the same terms to all customers. This application of the
expressive conduct test further illustrates why a blank cake should not be
considered speech, but expressive conduct, in the first place. As a result, if
Masterpiece Cakeshop had not been decided based on a religious animus

94 See Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 at *1 (describing history of creating “special”
wedding cakes and their role in the cake-cutting ceremony).
95 This would give some teeth to the O’Brien inquiry, which is currently being applied in many
jurisdictions in a highly deferential way. See Ben’s Bar v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 714 (7th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that O’Brien is nearly indistinguishable from the deferential time, place, and
manner scrutiny of content-neutral restrictions on speech).
96 Whether “Happy wedding!” is truly a unique message if written on almost every cake is a
difficult question, but “I support this same-sex (or opposite-sex) union,” or “I don’t support this same-sex
(or opposite-sex) union,” should likely be considered pure speech or expressive enough to survive O’Brien
scrutiny.
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rationale, I believe that an expressive conduct paradigm should have upheld
Colorado’s public accommodations law—if the purpose of the law was
unrelated to the suppression or compulsion of expression.
Professors Volokh and Carpenter argue in an amicus brief that the use
of non-traditional media removes First Amendment protection entirely unless
conduct is “intended to and likely to convey a . . . message.” 97 Their brief
does not directly track the differences between pure speech and expressive
conduct, but I agree with their approach that a custom-designed, nonprefabricated wedding cake may implicate free speech protections if it
communicates a clear message.98 In my view, those types of cakes should be
considered expressive conduct, not removed entirely from the ambit of First
Amendment protection.
Applying the O’Brien scrutiny in the way I have proposed would
invalidate laws that restrict more speech, such as cases involving more
traditional media of expression or cases where the cake contained a true
message or symbolic design details.99 The intermediate scrutiny of O’Brien
would allow the application to nondiscrimination laws in cases like
Masterpiece Cakeshop but would leave open the possibility of a different
result in cases that implicated and compelled more speech.
Future courts dealing with cases of expressive conduct must also decide
whether a reasonable observer would attribute a cake to the baker, or simply
to the purchaser, before even applying expressive conduct protections. As
Justice Gorsuch notes in his concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the
approach courts use to decide whether, for example, a custom-made cake is
protected speech must stay consistent across all cakes.100 Serious First

97 See Brief for American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4918194, at *14 (arguing that articles sold to consumers that use media
traditionally associated with expression should be considered pure speech).
98 Volokh and Carpenter appear to argue that many custom-made cakes will not communicate a
clear message, and I would disagree with that application of their approach. Id. at *19.
99 Only one of the concurrences in Masterpiece Cakeshop address how the case would be decided
if words were written on the cake. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1744 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). I can imagine a cake that says, simply, “Congratulations,”
might be treated differently, for First Amendment purposes, than a cake that says, “Congratulations on
your same-sex union” because the baker in the first scenario is not forced to write something he wouldn’t
articulate on cakes to opposite-sex couples. However, this argument is better suited to whether a baker
impermissibly discriminated based on customer identity or permissibly refused service based on
ideological message, which is not protected by Colorado’s public accommodations law.
100 See id. at 1736–37 (describing how the Commission treated bakers’ refusals to create cakes
denigrating same-sex marriage differently than Petitioner’s refusal to create a cake celebrating same-sex
marriage). But see Erica Goldberg, The Scope of the Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Will Be Determined
by the Concurrences, CROWDED THEATER (June 4, 2018), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/06/04/thescope-of-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-will-be-determined-by-the-concurrences/ (outlining Justice
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Amendment issues would arise if a civil rights commission deemed a cake’s
message to be attributable only to the customer in some cases, like those
involving bakers refusing to create cakes for same-sex weddings, but
attributable to the baker in other cases, such as if a baker refused to create a
cake with a message that denounced same-sex marriage. I believe it is fair to
attribute the message on a cake to the creator of the cake; any other position
would likely create a circularity problem where the compulsion renders the
speech not compelled under the First Amendment.
Whether a law compels or targets actual speech should be the crux of
good orthodoxy cases. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Janus, which
held that union dues for public sector unions constitutionally compel speech,
truly grapple with whether the union dues contributed are, indeed, speech but
base their decisions instead on what level of scrutiny attaches to employee
speech as manifested through union dues.101 The majority invokes Barnette
several times to demonstrate the perils of forcing people to serve as a
mouthpiece for the state’s message,102 and the dissent chastises the majority
for overturning a law simply based on its policy wishes.103 The dissent makes
a compelling argument that perhaps a lower level of scrutiny should have
attached to these contributions because of their connection to the employment
setting and the duties of the employee. The majority is correct that union dues
are clearly the speech of the employee, not the employer, undermining the
agency-based rationales for why employee speech is often entitled to less
First Amendment protection.104
Ultimately, the operative question, unaddressed by the majority, should
have been about when mandated dues are the speech of the dues payer. The
Court should have more closely and directly analyzed whether mandating

Kagan’s conclusion that there is a principled way to distinguish bakers who refuse to sell cakes denigrating
same-sex marriage from the situation in Masterpiece Cakeshop).
101 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018)
(discussing the differences between the deferential scrutiny suggested by the dissent and the scrutiny
applied by the majority).
102

Id. at 2463–64.

Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “weaponizing the First
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and
regulatory policy.”). For a discussion of why this type of cynicism may be unjustified and is corrosive to
our First Amendment regime, see Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism, the Janus Dissent, and the
Soul
of
the
First
Amendment,
CROWDED
THEATER
(July
3,
2018),
https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2018/07/03/first-amendment-cynicism-the-janus-dissent-and-the-soul-ofthe-first-amendment/.
103

104

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (majority opinion). According to Justice Alito:

When an employee engages in speech that is part of the employee’s job duties, the employee’s words
are really the words of the employer. . . . But when a union negotiates with the employer or represents
employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union speaks for the employees, not the employer.
Id.
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that public-sector employees give money to a private organization is more
similar to paying taxes, or even paying a private continuing education
organization,105 or more similar to classic instances of compelled speech like
forced donations to a political party. Mandatory union dues seem different
than continuing legal education, which is truly intended to improve an
employee’s job performance and thus is more similar to the less-protected
employee speech, but this is a hard question that should have been the focus
of the Janus decision. Separating compelled speech from unprotected
funding or conduct is paramount in good orthodoxy cases.
In academia, diversity statements have speech-like elements, in that they
are written statements by academics, describing their teaching, and, at some
schools, their scholarship. The required statement commits a professor to a
particular view and approach to scholarship and teaching. As a result, the
diversity statement requirement compels the statement in itself, which
professes particular views a professor may feel pressured into expressing, and
also requires future conformity with the statement in the professor’s teaching
and scholarship. Both the compulsion to make the statements and the effects
on teaching and scholarship, based on a school’s preferred approach to a
politicized topic, implicate aspects of Barnette.
Diversity statements, however, also memorialize the conduct-aspects of
the professor’s employment. Universities should have the right to ensure that
professors are not discriminating against students or unfairly disadvantaging
some based on unconscious biases. The simple request for professors to fill
out diversity statements by public schools may not be constitutionally
problematic, if a reasonable range of responses and viewpoints are permitted.
There are situations where diversity statements may become, and
perhaps have become, problematic, based on professional and even
constitutional protections for academic freedom. Under at least professional
and ethical standards of academic freedom—let alone constitutional ones—
faculty members deserve wide latitude to comport their classrooms as they
see fit, craft reasonable policies involving class participation, and design the
curriculum to best present the material, without implementing diversitybased remediation, so long as they do not discriminate against students. The
institution also has latitude to create diversity-based programming and foster
an atmosphere of inclusion, and where the university’s and the professor’s

105 An amicus brief analogizes agency fees to taxes and continuing education classes. See Brief
for Professors Eugene Volokh & William Baude as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Janus v.
Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL 527958 at *4–
5, *13 (comparing compelled union dues to taxes and to private organizations to which employees must
contribute funds).
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prerogatives conflict, schools should leave a reasonable range of
experimentation for professors.106
The Constitution does become relevant if professors at public schools
are compelled to echo the school’s political viewpoint on issues involving
diversity. The institution may take a particular position on the best way to
promote diversity, but faculty must be permitted to disagree. If a professor
believes that a focus on group differences or group remedies is illiberal, and
that efforts to achieve diversity become discriminatory and infringe on
individual students’ rights, the professor cannot be compelled to express a
different view. This honors the professors’ First Amendment rights, ensures
that their scholarship is not compromised by forced espousal of views to
which they do not ascribe, and leaves room for the school’s position to
evolve.107
B.

Impermissible Motives, Dignitary Interests, and Unanimity of
Opinion

When pure speech and expressive conduct conflict with laws protecting
historically marginalized groups, Barnette counsels against allowing certain
governmental motives to override free speech concerns. Barnette’s antipathy
towards a forced orthodoxy should mean that certain motives—like the
state’s desire to use individual’s speech to vindicate others’ dignitary
interests—are insufficient to override First Amendment concerns. The state
may regulate harmful conduct such as discrimination, which also implicates
dignitary concerns as well as causing economic harm. However, when the
state regulates speech or expressive conduct, its motive cannot be mandating
that others communicate a message of tolerance that affirms the dignity of
others. That motive, even for what the state believes to be a worthy cause

106 Hard cases in this context span the political spectrum. For example, a graduate-level teacher
who championed calling on students in an order based on their membership in certain historically
marginalized groups, saying she calls on white men “[only] if I have to,” see Don Sweeny, This Instructor
Calls on Black Women First and White Men Last. Critics Want Her Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 23, 2017,
2:11 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article180416296.html, has
adopted a strategy that I do not believe is protected by academic freedom, in that she is actively
discriminating against students in her classroom to remedy social injustice issues outside of the classroom.
See Goldberg & Sarabyn, supra note 51 (arguing that academic freedom should exist when a professor is
acting academically, not politically, and defending the distinction). If a university wants to prohibit
professors from engaging in open discrimination against students, instead of just trying to equalize
speaking opportunities, it should have that prerogative.
107 Schools change policies on issues as fundamental as whether to require mandatory
standardized admissions tests, and professors’ opinions on these issues should be at the forefront of these
changes.
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(and perhaps especially because the state believes it to be a worthy cause),108
tracks the compelled unanimity of opinion that Barnette rejects.
The government cannot vindicate dignitary interests by capitalizing on
the communicative value of speech to force others to communicate a message
of equal dignity. If an artist does not believe that, as an example, Jewish
people’s beliefs are as wholesome, or as correct, as Christian people’s beliefs,
the government cannot force that artist to depict messages of tolerance. The
government cannot force individuals to communicate a message that others
are worthy of equal dignity, even if that message is right, even if that message
represents the foundation of our country, and even if the government may
itself communicate that message and regulate conduct in order to promote
that message. The concrete, material effects of the regulation can be
considered when applying intermediate scrutiny to expressive conduct,109 but
courts should not invalidate statutes based the dignitary harm caused by
speech. In most cases, when pure speech is involved, strict scrutiny should
defeat the statute so as to avoid dilution of the strict scrutiny standard that
would jeopardize our full panoply of First Amendment rights. Thus, even if
pure speech has concrete, material effects, speech compulsion or prohibition
should not survive strict scrutiny even if these types of regulations would
survive intermediate scrutiny.
At oral argument, the Justices in Masterpiece Cakeshop should thus not
have focused on dignitary interests—as hard as this is to do.110 Dignity, as an
interest, is so amorphous as to invite viewpoint-based discrimination,
antithetical to our viewpoint-neutral free speech regime, by courts and
legislatures. Further, an opposition to speech that undermines others’ dignity
for particular reasons or based on particular characteristics is a viewpointbased consideration in and of itself. Speech that harms another’s dignity does
so because the listener is profoundly offended and invalidated by the
message, or viewpoint, expressed. The Court ruled in Matal v. Tam that the
Patent and Trademark Office may not refuse to issue trademarks that
disparage other individuals or groups because the disparagement clause is a

108 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in NIFLA v. Becerra reflected this sentiment, when he
remarked that “[t]he California Legislature included in its official history the congratulatory statement
that the Act was part of California’s legacy of forward thinking. But it is not forward thinking to force
individuals to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view they find
unacceptable.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
109 Concrete, material effects include the inability of a certain minority group to obtain access to
goods and services, an effect produced regardless of the communicative effect of the speech, if a particular
group is discriminated against in the provision of goods and services.
110 Justice Kennedy, for example, asked about whether deciding the case in favor of Masterpiece
Cakeshop would lead to results that are “an affront to the gay community.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 27, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
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viewpoint-based restriction on speech.111 Under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state may not target particular groups in
ways that undermine their dignity and autonomy, but, without state action,
private individuals are allowed to express ideas that offend others to the very
core.
This argument becomes more complicated when discussing requiring
professors to create diversity statements. Affirming the equal dignity of every
student, regardless of status characteristics, is a critical part of a professor’s
job and creates an environment where students can best learn. Professors who
actively and explicitly make statements to students reflecting racial- or
gender-based animus are doing their students a disservice, and the school can
rightly intervene. That said, professors who simply hold different views on
affirmative action, or speak out against perhaps over-compensatory diversity
measures, should not be deemed to be undermining the dignity of their
students. In an academic setting, students need to tolerate views that upset
them, or even disturb them to their core, especially from other students, and
perhaps even from professors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Understanding the modern compelled speech cases in light of Barnette
can be helpful in bridging the growing political divide between the right and
the left on free speech issues. Barnette, a case involving opposition to certain
types of forced patriotism, codes as a left-leaning opinion by those who, for
simplicity, categorization, or other political purposes, reduce judicial
opinions to left-right outcomes. Cases similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop will
code as right-leaning invocations of the First Amendment. However, the
appreciation that forced unanimity of opinion comes in many forms, and
undermines the expressive rights of many different groups, may force
partisans to think about these cases at a higher level of abstraction, above the
outcome in any particular case.
The key to ensuring that individuals across the political spectrum can
accept both the reasoning and the results in any given opinion will be drawing
clear, meaningful, nonpartisan lines between speech and conduct that
safeguard our ability to express unpopular sentiments while preserving laws
that mainly target conduct and benefit groups who have been historically
oppressed by our country’s laws.

111 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (holding that the Patent and Trademark Office
violated the First Amendment when it refused to grant a trademark to the band The Slants on the basis
that the trademark was disparaging to individuals of Asian descent).

